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Taleb (2018) claimed a novel approach to evaluating the quality of probabilistic election forecasts via
no-arbitrage pricing techniques and argued that popular forecasts of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election
had violated arbitrage boundaries. We show that under mild assumptions all such political forecasts are
arbitrage-free and that the heuristic that Taleb’s argument was based on is false.
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1. Introduction
Forecasts of a candidate’s probability of winning an election have become a staple of political
journalism over the last decade, with the most prominent being those reported on the website
FiveThirtyEight, for example in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election; see FiveThirtyEight (2016).
Taleb (2018) was motivated to critique the quality of election forecasts by the apparent instability
of these probabilities through time. FiveThirtyEight reported a probability of Clinton winning the
2016 election that ranged from 55 to 85 percent over the final five months. According to Taleb, this
was indicative of ‘stark errors’ and ‘severe violations’ of standard results in quantitative finance,
specifically no-arbitrage option pricing. Imposing a no-arbitrage constraint on election forecast
probabilities, as binary options written on the candidate’s vote share, would therefore, according
to Taleb, eliminate such instabilities.
In this paper we show that Taleb’s argument was mistaken. First, one of the ‘standard results’ of
quantitative finance that his election forecast assessments rely on is false, as we demonstrate with
a simple counterexample. Next, we show that binary option prices can easily exhibit as much or
more variability through time as the 2016 Presidential election forecasts without violating any no-
arbitrage constraints. We argue that, under mild assumptions concerning the information available
to a forecaster, all such election forecasts are arbitrage-free. Finally, we comment on a problem
regarding an ill-defined variable in Taleb’s election model and what this implies for the general
applicability of option pricing methods to election forecasting.
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2. Summary of Taleb’s argument
We being by summarizing Taleb’s argument, which consists of five main steps. We also take this
opportunity to fix some notation and definitions:
(i) He claims that the forecast probability for an event, such as a candidate winning an election,
should be considered as the price of a binary option taking the terminal value 1 if the event
happens and 0 otherwise. This can be thought of a derivative security on an underlying
‘asset’ variable Yt, e.g., the candidate’s number of supporters among the population of
voters at a given time t, with the election outcome determined by whether YT exceeds some
threshold l at terminal time T . Arbitrage pricing theory will then dictate limits on the
behavior of these prices/probabilities over time.
(ii) He gives a model for the stochastic process governing the underlying asset Yt. To produce a
Yt that is bounded in some range [L,H], Taleb assumes Yt = S(Xt) for a ‘shadow process’
Xt satisfying a tractable stochastic differential equation, where S is a function taking the
real line to a finite interval. He makes the choice:
dXt = σ
2Xtdt+ σdWt
and
S(x) =
1
2
+
1
2
erf(x)
where erf(x) = 2√
pi
∫
x
0
exp(−t2)dt.
Note that
1
2
S′′(x) + xS′(x) = 0
With that choice in place, Itoˆ’s formula implies Yt satisfies
dYt =
(
1
2
σ2S′′(Xt) + σ2XtS′(Xt)
)
dt+ σS′(Xt)dWt
= 0 · dt+ σS′(Xt)dWt
That is, the process Yt is a bounded martingale.
(iii) Since the process Xt is the familiar Bachelier-style model for an asset price, the price of
a binary option of Xt has a known formula. Arguing that this price is equal to the price
one would obtain for the binary option on Yt with the corresponding threshold value, this
gives the election forecast probability. Substituting x = S−1(y) into the option pricing
formula for X gives the price in terms of the currently observed value of Yt at a given time.
Since Yt is a martingale, Taleb argues that the stochastic equation for Yt represents the
dynamics under the risk-neutral measure, and therefore the price obtained for the binary
option represents the probability of YT exceeding the threshold, that is, the probability
of the given candidate winning the election. Since the forecast probabilities are derived as
option prices, under this measure they are also martingales.
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(iv) A heuristic from option pricing suggests that the greater the volatility of the underlying
asset, the closer the binary option price should be to 0.5 and the lower the volatility of
the option price should be over time. A numerical example for the forecast probability of
Trump winning the 2016 Presidential election shows that Taleb’s model gives prices close to
0.5 until just before election day, at which point it jumps to near 1.0, in agreement with the
heuristic argument. Observing electoral forecasts such as those made by FiveThirtyEight
show forecast probabilities deviating significantly from 0.5 and fluctuating widely, even at
a date far in advance of the election. He claims this means the FiveThirtyEight forecasts
must have ‘violate[d] arbitrage boundaries.’
(v) Taleb then compares his martingale-pricing approach with an argument due to de Finetti
(Williamson 2009) that forecast probabilities be evaluated by means of the Brier score
1
n
n∑
i=1
(1i − pi)2
where p1, . . . , pn are prices of bets laid on the outcomes of n independent events, and 1i
is the indicator function taking the value 1 if the event occurred and 0 otherwise. In order
to minimize losses according to this score, an agent will place bets in agreement with their
probabilities for the events. He claims the martingale-pricing technique gives a continuous
time analogue of the same idea.
3. Criticism
3.1. The behavior of option prices with respect to volatility
Taleb’s heuristic regarding the behavior of binary option prices as the volatility of the underlying
increases is only partially true. He claims that ‘[a] standard result in quantitative finance is that
when the volatility of the underlying security increases, arbitrage pressures push the correspond-
ing binary option to trade closer to 50%, and become less variable over the remaining time to
expiration.’ It is the case that for a given ‘spot-price’ Yt and a given threshold value l, as the
volatility σ in the stochastic model for Yt is increased, under general conditions the binary option
price/probability of exceeding the threshold should converge to 0.5. For example, if the stochastic
process for Yt were a simple Brownian motion with drift
dYt = µdt+ σdWt
the conditional distribution for YT given Yt would be N(Yt, σ
2(T − t)) and so the binary option
price for strike l at time t would be
B(t, T ) = 1− Φ
(
l − Yt − µ(T − t)
σ
√
T − t
)
where Φ is the standard normal cdf. This converges to 0.5 as σ goes to∞. Other processes depending
on a volatility parameter will show the same behavior.
However, the prices B(t, T ) one actually observed over time would not stabilize around 0.5,
because the higher volatility for the process Y would also result in a wider distribution for Yt at
any given t. Taking the same example above with Y0 = 0, we have an unconditional cdf for B(t, T )
given by
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P [B(t, T ) < x] = P
[
Φ
(
l − Yt − µ(T − t)
σ
√
T − t
)
> 1− x
]
= Φ
(
l − µ(T − t)− σ√T − tΦ−1(1− x)− µt
σ
√
t
)
= Φ
(
l − µT
σ
√
t
−
√
T
t
− 1Φ−1(1− x)
)
So, as σ →∞, we end up with a distribution for B(t, T ) that is stable but certainly not a point
mass at 0.5. In particular, at the midway point t = T/2, if we have set our threshold l to be equal
to the projected mean of YT , l = µT , then we will have
P [B(t, T ) < x] = Φ
(−Φ−1(1− x)) = 1− Φ(Φ−1(1− x)) = x
and so B(t, T ) has the uniform distribution on [0, 1] regardless of σ.
This counterexample shows that Taleb’s second claim, that as volatility increases binary option
prices ‘become less variable over the remaining time to expiration,’ is false. Instead, the variability
of the paths of the option price may be completely independent of the volatility in the underlying.
This has profound implications on his criticism of election forecasts. For example, assuming a
simple random-walk model for a given candidate’s vote share, if the process stays close to the value
50% we may observe the win-probability fluctuate widely through time despite arbitrarily small
fluctuations in the polls. The figures below show one such simulated path over 1000 days where we
have set the size of daily poll movements to 0.1%. We could just have easily chosen 0.000001% or
any small number.
Figure 1. Simulated candidate vote share for a random-walk process; step = 0.01%
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Figure 2. Simulated candidate win-probability for a random-walk process; step = 0.01%
The size of these fluctuations in poll numbers and forecast win-probability are roughly consistent
with what was observed in 2016.
In fact, even in Taleb’s model, if the same s parameter, representing annualized volatility in the
polls, is used to project the polls as well as construct the forecasts, the paths do not stabilize at
0.5 for high volatilities. For example, the figure below shows one such path with s = 100%:
Figure 3. Simulated candidate win-probability for Taleb’s pricing model; s = 100%
Intuitively speaking, the greater we assume the implied volatility for the pricing model Yt to
be, the greater we must also assume the realized volatility to be; the former pulls option prices in
toward 0.5 for any given spot-price while the latter widens the distribution of the actual spot-price
we observe. Since the same volatility we observe is priced into the option, the two effects more-
or-less exactly cancel, leaving the paths of forecast probabilities/prices unchanged. For Taleb’s
demonstrated stable probabilities to manifest, we would need to consistently use a higher implied
volatility than what has been realized, an ‘excess volatility’ assumption that he does not explicitly
state or attempt to justify.
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3.2. Election predictions are arbitrage-free
Framing election forecasting as a problem of option pricing adds needless complication and intro-
duces the possibility of confusion. Taleb’s argument relies on an analogy to the problem: given
a model for the dynamics of an asset price under real-world probabilities P, price an option on
the asset. The Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing implies that in a complete market with no
arbitrage there is an equivalent probability measure Q under which all assets earn the risk-free
rate r on average, including the option. Setting r = 0 would make all assets martingales under
this measure. Thus, the value at any given time for any derivative security is simply the average
of its possible values at any future time; for a binary option this implies the price is equal to the
probability of occurrence for the payoff event.
However, the task facing a forecaster is not one of pricing an option but of assigning a real
probability. Suppose this is done over the filtration (Ft) of information available to the forecaster
at any given time. Granting Taleb’s assertion that the probabilities should be thought of as prices,
and that these prices should be martingales under the real-world measure, we still needn’t bother
with the artifice of defining a stochastic model for Yt under which it is a martingale and pricing
an option written on Yt. Instead, we can achieve exactly the dynamic Taleb desires by considering
any stochastic process at all for Yt and then quoting the probability
B(t, T ) = P[YT > l|Ft]
These probabilities/prices always produce an (Ft)−martingale by the tower property of condi-
tional expectation:
E[B(t, T )|Fs] = E[E[1YT>l]|Ft]|Fs] = E[1YT>l]|Fs] = B(s, T )
for any times s < t.
Thus, Taleb’s construction of a martingale Yt is sufficient but not necessary for the forecast
probabilities to be martingales, which makes his shadow process Xt doubly unnecessary. Taleb’s
construction requires a bounded martingale that can be written as some monotonic function of
a process for which the option prices were possible to compute, but he could have skipped that
entirely.
Different forecasters may disagree in their assessments, and the results may be profitable for
one or the other. Whether the forecaster’s probabilities allow for profitable investments over time
will depend on the judgments of the forecaster and the investor. However, since the forecaster’s
conditional probabilities are automatically martingales with respect to their own filtration, there
is no possibility for arbitrage unless the two assigned probability measures are not equivalent. In
order to exhibit arbitrage, then, Taleb would need to show an event a forecaster assigned nonzero
probability to was actually impossible, or conversely, a forecaster claimed an actually possible event
had probability zero.
3.3. The definition of the underlying
Finally, Taleb’s analysis suffers from a lack of precision about the meaning of the ‘underlying’ asset
Yt, from which the election results are meant to be determined. He desires it both to be the vote
count/share YT at the terminal date (or number of electoral votes for determining a presidential
election outcome) and yet also to be measurable by some means at times t < T as ‘an intermediate
realization of the process at t.’ This would be possible if the opinion of every potential voter in
the U.S. were known at every given time, in which case the volatility of Yt would correspond to
changes of opinion.
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However, the problem for the forecaster is that the intentions of every person are not known and
must be estimated from polls/samples. Thus, the uncertainty facing a political forecaster such as
FiveThirtyEight is that these samples themselves have uncertainty, as do the proportions of people
who actually vote in the election. Taleb later defines Yt to be ‘the observed estimated proportion
of votes’ (emphasis ours). If we treat Yt as the estimated proportions of voters, as given by the
samples, we would find it inadequate to determine the election of the outcome; elections are decided
by the actual vote counts, not a final random sample of voters on election day. This means that
the process Yt cannot possibly be both an underlying asset for the derivative and adapted to the
filtration of information available to the forecaster.
4. Conclusion
Taleb’s criticism of popular forecast probabilities, specifically the election forecasts of FiveThir-
tyEight, was inspired by a judgment that they tend to fluctuate too much given a reasonable
amount of uncertainty in the future changes in popular opinion. He attempted to cast this as a
violation of the principles of option pricing and to produce an alternative model by constructing a
bounded martingale with known binary option prices exhibiting the dynamics he sought. However,
the situation facing the forecaster is one of assigning probabilities, not prices, and this can be
done in the real-world measure without reference to an underlying martingale asset. As long as
these probabilites are updated consistenly according to rules of conditional probability, they will
automatically be martingales. If the forecaster’s probability measure is equivalent to an investor’s,
then according to the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing arbitrage is impossible even if the
forecasts are treated as prices. There may be profitable, but risky, market opportunities if investors
have different probability assessments than the forecasters, but this is simply an argument that
the investors’ forecasts are better.
Taleb’s heuristic of greater volatility/uncertainty giving binary option prices that stabilize around
0.5 suggested that these forecasts had violated arbitrage boundaries, presumably, by understating
the amount of uncertainty. However, that heuristic is neither true nor relevant. The paths of
the conditional probabilities of a stochastic process terminating above some threshold level do
not necessarily converge to constant lines at 0.5 as volatility increases. It’s possible to produce
counterexamples where the distribution of prices at some intermediate point may be uniform on
[0, 1], independent of the volatility of the underlying. This implies the observed variability in
election forecasts is not necessarily indicative of any errors at all. The forecast probabilities may
have fluctuated because they priced in only as much volatility as had been observed in the polls,
a reasonable assumption that Taleb does not argue against. In any event, this is not a question of
arbitrage.
Finally, the lack of clarity as to what the underlying asset Yt represents in Taleb’s model speaks
to a misunderstanding of the kinds of uncertainty facing the forecaster. In quantitative finance, an
asset with an observable price is given a stochastic model, and fluctuations in that price determine
the uncertainty of the terminal payoffs of various derivatives. In election forecasting, the “price”
itself is unknown and unknowable. Thus, the whole framework of derivative pricing is arguably
inapplicable here, which is no great loss since there was no need for it in the first place.
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